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2Abstract
Optimal harvesting of prey in a predator-prey ecosystem is studied under the
condition that the existence of the predator has value. Predators (birds) and humans
(fishers) compete for prey (shellfish). The behavior of the system is studied and
conditions for optimal control are deduced. Various optimal harvesting rates are
identified for particular ecosystem characteristics, harvesting costs, the discount rate
value, and value functions for birds. These optimal harvest rates are constant
harvesting, at levels possibly leading to the extinction of birds, or oscillating
harvesting, giving rise to oscillating stocks of birds and shellfish. The approach path
towards an optimal regime is shown qualitatively and consists of alternating between
harvesting maximally and not harvesting at all.
31. Introduction
The subject of harvesting in predator-prey systems has been of interest to
economists, ecologists and natural resource managers for some time now. Most
research has focused attention on optimal exploitation, guided entirely by profits from
harvesting. Clark [1], Hannesson [2], Ragozin and Brown [3], and Ströbele and
Wacker [4] derive golden rules for optimal steady-state harvesting in a multi-species
context. In addition, Ragozin and Brown [3] study the approach path towards the
optimal steady state. Semmler and Sieveking [5] show that an optimal constant
harvesting effort can result in a trajectory that does not reach equilibrium but
oscillates over time. Except for Tu and William [6], who consider the stability of an
ecosystem for predator control programs in combination with harvesting of prey, no
attention has been given to nature protection policies in multi-species systems. A
critical review of different types of predator-prey relations is found in [7] and [8].
The present paper seeks to find optimal exploitation strategies for a predator-prey
system, but differs in two respects from the previous studies. First, the ecosystem
model is based on a more realistic specification of predation than the familiar Lotka-
Volterra type. In particular, it includes search and handling of prey by predators in
order to derive the ecosystem dynamics. Secondly, and more importantly, prey is
harvested while predators are protected. More specifically, in contrast to other studies,
we explicitly value the existence of a species, in this case the predator. Although the
predator species is itself not harvested, incorporating its existence value is necessary
because it is indirectly affected by the harvesting of its food.
Although the formal model analyzed will be fairly general, it is motivated by a
specific conflict between shellfisheries and the conservation of bird species in the
Netherlands. The theoretical analysis that follows was initiated by a large
multidisciplinary research project to study the harvesting of cockles and mussels in
the Dutch Wadden Sea. The Wadden Sea is a wetland, located in the north of The
Netherlands, that extends to the east along the German and Danish coasts. The area is
an important breeding ground for birds and a stopover for migrating birds. Birds
preying on shellfish, such as oystercatchers and eiderducks come under the protection
of national and EU law and international agreements by the countries bordering the
Wadden Sea.
This paper is an endeavor to theoretically investigate the balance between
exploitation and nature conservation. This balance is reflected in the social welfare
function. The social welfare function consists of two terms. One expresses the income
4generated by harvesting shellfish. The other represents conservation benefits derived
from the presence of a certain amount of birds in the ecosystem. The optimal harvest
rate maximizes the social welfare function. An optimal trajectory approaches either a
fixed steady state or an optimal cyclic state [3]. The optimal harvest trajectory is
divided into two parts: an end state and the approach path. We develop a method to
find the optimal end state(s) and give necessary conditions for its (their) existence. In
addition, we present a qualitative analysis of the approach path towards the end state.
We consider a simplified ecosystem containing only one general type of bird and
one general type of shellfish. Birds depend entirely on shellfish for food. The amount
of food eaten by birds has an upper limit, even if shellfish are abundant. The model
can be used to describe general predator-prey ecosystems and even herbivore-plant
systems, as long as their interactions obey what biologists refer to as a Holling type II
functional response [9].
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the ecosystem model.
Section 3 analyses the behavior of the ecosystem under fixed harvest rates. The end
state of optimal harvesting is examined in Section 4. Section 5 provides a qualitative
analysis of the approach paths to the end state. Finally, we discuss our results in
Section 6.
2. The ecosystem model
The ecosystem model describes the interactive dynamics between predators
(birds) and prey (shellfish). In the model the following assumptions are made. The
rate at which new birds are born and the amount of birds that die due to starvation and
other causes, control the net growth of the number of birds. The number of bird
offspring is linearly related to the number of adults. Bird numbers decline when there
is not enough food (shellfish) available, which is modeled through a decrease in the
life expectancy of birds. The average lifetime of birds depends on their energy intake.
Energy intake per bird (
B
e ) less than the reference level ( 0e ) reduces their lifetime
linearly. The energy intake is limited by the time birds need to find and handle
shellfish, which are considered the only source of food for birds.
The net growth rate of birds is described by the following equation. The first term
expresses growth, which depends on the birth rate. The second term expresses
decline, which depends on the average age that on turn depends on energy intake.
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where
B : the number of birds;
r : the birth rate of birds;
0e : the reference energy intake rate per bird;
e : the total energy intake rate.
b : reference average bird age
Equation (1) is the logistic equation [9] and 
0e
reb
 is called the carrying capacity.
The energy intake depends linearly on the amount of shellfish eaten. It is given
by:
cde = , (2)
where
c : the energy content of a shellfish;
d : the number of shellfish depleted,
The depletion depends on the time a bird needs to search for shellfish and the
amount of time it needs to break open the shellfish and swallow its contents. The
search time decreases as the number of shellfish becomes larger. This is expressed in
the following equation:
hSz
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hSz
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= , (3)
where
S : the number of shellfish;
z : the search time coefficient;
h : the handling time (per bird per shellfish).
This equation is known as Holling’s disc equation [9]. Equation (3) shows that the
amount of food intake per bird is asymptotically limited. Indirectly, therefore, also the
life expectancy of birds has an upper limit.
Shellfish die due to being eaten by birds, being harvested by fishers or because
of other factors such as lack of food, cold winters etc. Shellfish are recruited
independently of the number of existing adult shellfish. New shellfish recruits arrive
in the area through wind driven and tidal currents. Their survival depends on a
number of factors such as the seabottom characteristics, food supply, temperature and
preying fish. These factors are, however too complex to be included in our model.
Measurements in the Wadden Sea do not show a strong relationship between
6recruitment and the adult stock size of shellfish [10]. Therefore, recruitment is
modeled as an exogenous variable that is independent of S . The number of shellfish
is given by:
yd
a
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−−−= , (4)
where
q : the shellfish recruit rate;
a : the average shellfish age, if not eaten by birds or fished;
y : the shellfish harvest rate.
Substituting equations (2) and (3) in (1) and (4) and creating the parameter
0e
rcbK = , results in the following predator-prey system:
yBSf
a
S
hSz
BSyq
dt
dS
S −=−+
−−= ),( (5)
and
),(1 BSf
KS
hSz
rB
dt
dB
B=

 +
−= . (6)
The parameter K  shows the time a bird needs to eat (find and handle) a unit of
shellfish in equilibrium. If a bird needs more time, due to a long search time ( Sz )
because of low stock sizes of shellfish, the numbers of birds will decrease. If it needs
less time, due to high shellfish numbers, the numbers of birds will increase.
Because we assume shellfish is the only food birds eat, the mass of birds can not
increase more than the mass of eaten shellfish. This leads to an extra restriction on the
ecological parameters because we do not allow the creation of mass. The condition is
deduced in Appendix I.
3. Ecosystem behavior under fixed harvest rates
The behavior of non-linear systems can be characterized by standard equilibrium,
stability and bifurcation analysis [11]. Stability analysis in predator-prey models has
received widespread attention, in the case of Lotka-Volterra type models, e.g. May
[12]. Brauer and Soudack [13] studied the behavior of a general predator-prey system
(which includes Lotka-Volterra models and the model in this paper), where the
predator is harvested at a constant rate. Dai and Tang [14] examine a more specific
model in which predators and prey are harvested. These studies show that, depending
7on parameter values a stable equilibrium, a limit cycle or a homoclinic1 orbit is
possible.
In the following analysis we show that the ecosystem model under study will
approach equilibrium when the harvesting rate is kept constant. For sufficiently high
harvest rates, the ecosystem changes to a one-dimensional system in which birds are
extinct.
The ecosystem described here has two equilibrium points ( 0=
•
S , 0=
•
B ) :
ahK
KzKyqBe )()(1 −−−= , hK
zSe
−
=1 (7)
and
02 =eB , ayqSe )(2 −= . (8)
Note that, in the first equilibrium, the number of shellfish does not depend on
the harvest rate, y . If the harvest rate increases, the number of shellfish in
equilibrium does not decrease. Extra harvesting takes food away from birds therefore
the ecosystem can sustain fewer birds.
In the second equilibrium, birds have become extinct. The first equilibrium
can exist only when 
hK
z
ayq
−
>− )(  and hK > , because the numbers of birds and
shellfish need to be positive. When these conditions are not fulfilled, the system will
reach the second equilibrium. As long as, 
hK
z
ayq
−
>− )( ,the condition for
existence of the first equilibrium holds, fishers can fish and a certain bird population
size can be sustained. Clearly, the number of shellfish in equilibrium is greatest when
the birds have become extinct and fishing is stopped. Since q  is independent of S ,
the double extinction of both birds and shellfish is not an equilibrium unless qy = .
Figure 1 shows the phase diagram of the system. It contains an example
trajectory, the S- and B-isoclines, and the direction of the system’s vector field. The
B-isocline, i.e. the curve on which the number of birds does not change ( 0=
•
B ), is
given by 1eShK
zS =
−
=  and by 0=B . The B-isocline separates the region where the
number of birds increases from the region where it decreases. When 1eSS ≤ , then
0≤
dt
dB
; and, when 1eSS ≥ , then 0≥dt
dB
. The number of shellfish does not change
                                                     
1
 In a homoclinic orbit a seperatrix of a saddle point originates from that saddle point.
8on the S-isocline ( 0=
•
S ), which is given by 
S
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separates regions of shellfish decrease from regions of shellfish increase. When
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dt
dS
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dt
dS
. Combining these conditions leads to a vector field that indicates the direction
of the trajectories.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of the ecosystem under a fixed harvest rate.
Note: An example trajectory of the simple predator-prey system is shown.  The isoclines are shown in
gray and the equilibrium points as black dots. The arrows denote the direction of the trajectories.
The arrows show that a trajectory will either tend to, or originate from, or
circle around the first equilibrium, ),( 11 ee BS . In Appendix II we show that every
trajectory approaches equilibrium. The second equilibrium (equation (8)) is a saddle
point and can only be reached when the number of birds becomes zero. The S-isocline
depends on the harvest rate. When fishing increases, the S-isocline moves down and
the number of birds in equilibrium ( 1eB ) consequently declines. Figure 2 shows the
case when the harvest rate becomes so large: namely, 
ahK
zqy )( −−> , that the
isoclines do not intersect in the quadrant where S  and B  are positive. Then )0,( 2eS  is
the only feasible equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the ecosystem under a high fixed harvest rate.
Note: The harvesting rate is so high that birds become extinct. The isoclines are shown in gray and the
single equilibrium point as a black dot. The arrows denote the direction of the trajectories.
From the stability analysis (Appendix II) we know that the first equilibrium
),( 11 ee BS is globally stable. This means that, starting from any point in the first
quadrant ( 0>S , 0>B ), a trajectory will tend to the equilibrium. The equilibrium will
be a stable node, meaning that the trajectory asymptotically approaches the
equilibrium directly, if the birth rate of birds ( r ) is larger than the mortality rate of
shellfish ( a1 ), or if 1eS  and 2eS  are either relatively far apart or relatively close
together (Appendix II). Otherwise, the equilibrium will be a stable focus, i.e. the
trajectory oscillates around the equilibrium with ever decreasing amplitude.
Consequently, assuming the unharvested system has a stable node ( 12 ee SS >>  and
a
r
1
> ), increased fishing will change the equilibrium from a node to a focus and back
again to a node until finally the birds become extinct.
One can get a feel for how the system behaves under dynamic (non-fixed) harvest
rates if one considers such a system to approach a moving target: namely, the
changing equilibrium because it depends on y .
The consequence of global stability is that fishing will not irreversibly change the
system. As long as birds are not made extinct by excessive fishing of their food
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supply, the system is able to recover. Once fishing is stopped, the system will
asymptotically approach its natural equilibrium.
4. Optimal harvesting and ecosystem value
4.1  Problem formulation and necessary conditions
Suppose a governing body manages the fishery by setting quotas or by taking
other measures to control shellfish harvesting. Its objective is to optimally exploit the
resource, while taking into account the social value of the state of the ecosystem,
expressed by the number of birds. When birds are not socially valued, it would be
advantageous to catch shellfish until birds are extinct. The reason is that, in these
circumstances either more shellfish are caught or a competitor is eliminated and
harvest can therefore proceed at the same rate but, given the higher shellfish stock, at
lower costs. The main question here is: What are the implications of a social valuation
of birds on optimal harvesting? In order to address this issue, we assume that the
governing body strives to maximize the following social welfare function, in which
the value of birds in the ecosystem and the profits (revenues minus costs) of fishing
are added and discounted over time:
tyScpyBveJ t
y
d ))()((max
0
∫∞ − −+= δ , (9)
here
δ :  the discount rate;
)(Bv :  the value assigned to the state of the ecosystem;
p :  the price of a unit shellfish;
)(Sc :  the cost of harvesting.
The price of shellfish is set constant, as we assume the amount harvested in
this particular area will have a negligible influence on the overall supply of shellfish
on the market. The cost of fishing is assumed to decrease with stock size, 0)( ≤
∂
∂
S
Sc
,
and the value of birds to increase with their stock size, 0)( ≥
∂
∂
B
Bv
. We assume that
the harvesting costs are linear in y . The interpretation is that labor can be hired at
constant cost and is needed proportionally to the harvest rate. Later, we will relax this
assumption (see Section 4.6). In addition, it is assumed that the existence of a fixed
number of boats determines the maximum harvest rate ( maxy ). The value function of
birds is assumed to be concave or S-shaped (see Figure AIII-1 in Appendix III).
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Apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle [15], the current value Hamiltonian is:
),()),(()()( BSfyBSfyScpyBvH BBSS λλ +−+−+= .            (10)
The equations that form the necessary conditions for a solution are :
• the maximum condition:
max0   ,))((maxmax yyyScpH Syy ≤≤−−⇒ λ ,            (11)
where, maxy  is the maximum harvest rate;
• the familiar equations of motion for the state (5) and (6), which we repeat for
clarity:
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• and the equations of motion for the co-state or shadow prices:
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• and because 0≥S  and 0≥B , the transversality condition:
0lim ≥
∞→
S
t
λ ,   0lim ≥
∞→
B
t
λ .            (14)
Given the linear form of the harvesting cost function, ySc )( , the Hamiltonian
(10) depends linearly on y  with coefficient ))(( sScp λ−− . Consequently, its
maximum value is reached for the extremes of y , i.e. the harvest rate must be either 0
or maxy . This leads to the rule that one must fish as much as possible when the
shadow price of shellfish is sufficiently low ( )(Scps −<λ ), and not fish at all when
the shadow price is sufficiently high ( )(Scps −>λ ). Furthermore, when
)(Scps −=λ , the harvest rate is undetermined. In this case, three solutions for y  are
possible: namely, 0, maxy  or )(~ ty  the singular control that maintains the condition
)(Scps −=λ . So, the optimal control path will be bang-bang (i.e. harvesting
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maximally or not harvesting at all or alternating between the two) or singular (i.e.
keeping the revenues equal to the shadow price)
We assume there is a unique optimal path. After an initial period, the system
will arrive at some end state. The optimal trajectory of the system will approach either
an equilibrium or a cycle. Suppose the optimal path does not approach equilibrium,
then it must cross itself. At this point, the optimal path must continue as it did before
or it will not be unique. This implies a cycle. So, finally, the optimal trajectory will
reach an equilibrium or a cycle. We call this the end state. The approach path is the
beginning of the optimal trajectory until the end state is reached.
The remainder of this section is devoted to examining the end state.
Remember that the harvest rate of an optimal trajectory and thus of the end state must
be bang-bang, singular, or a combination of both. This means the following four end
states are conceivable:
1) No harvesting: 0=y  and sScp λ≤− )( . The end state is in equilibrium and the
harvest rate is part of a bang-bang control (see Section 4.2).
2) Maximum harvesting: maxyy =  and sScp λ≥− )( . The end state is in
equilibrium and the harvest rate is part of a bang-bang control (see Section 4.3).
3) A singular state: )(~ tyy =  and sScp λ=− )(  (see Section 4.4). A singular harvest
rate is applied. This can result in two types of singular equilibria (see Section
4.4.1): one in which birds exist (section 4.4.1.1), and one in which birds are
extinct (see Section 4.4.1.2), or it can result in a limit cycle (see Section 4.4.2).
4) A bang-bang cycle, i.e. an oscillation controlled by a harvest rate that flips back
and forth between the maximum, zero and possibly a singular harvest rate:
maxyy = , when sScp λ>− )( ; 0=y , when sScp λ<− )( ; and, )(~ tyy = ,
0=y , or maxyy = , when sScp λ=− )( . (see Section 4.5)
4.2 No harvesting: case 1
The first possibility is straightforward. Not harvesting is optimal, when in the
equilibrium ),( 11 ee BS , the total cost of fishing ( SSc λ+)( ) exceeds the price of
shellfish. This means that, at any harvest rate the loss in social value of birds would be
greater than the net gain from fisheries.
4.3 Maximum harvesting: case 2
The second possibility is to keep harvesting at the maximum level. In this
case, the price of shellfish must exceed the total costs. If the maximum harvest level is
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relatively small ( )(max hKa
zqy
−
−< , see equation 7), then the system will
asymptotically reach the equilibrium ),( 11 ee BS . But if )(max hKa
zqy
−
−≥  then the
system approaches the other equilibrium )0,( 2eS , in which birds are extinct. The
condition SScp λ>− )(  and the transversality condition (14) imply that )(Scp > .
So, obviously fishing must make a monetary profit. For an end state in which
harvesting is at its maximum, the transversality condition (14) implies pSc e <)( 1 , if
)(max hKa
zqy
−
−< , or pSc e <)( 2 , if )(max hKa
zqy
−
−≥ .
4.4 A singular state: case 3
The third possibility is an end state in which the total system (state and co-
state) is kept in a singular state. From the maximum condition (11), it follows that at
this end state we have to satisfy:
)(ScpS −=λ .            (15)
Substituting (15) and its derivative, )~( yf
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SS −∂
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λ , in (12) gives the
following expression for Bλ  in the singular state,
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provided 0≠
∂
∂
S
fB
 (i.e. 0≠B ). We take the time derivative of expression (16) for Bλ
and substitute it, together with (15), in (13). This eliminates both shadow prices and
we get the following expression that implicitly defines y~ , the harvest rate in the
singular state:
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We have ignored a function’s variable list so as not to further complicate the
expression. Equation (17) means that we can find the singular harvest rate for every
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point in the phase diagram. Be aware, however, that max~0 yy ≤≤ , and thus y~  may
not be not feasible for every value of S  and B .
If a singular harvest rate is employed, an autonomous system results that
describes the singular trajectories:
),(~),( BSyBSf
dt
dS
S −=            (18)
and
),( BSf
dt
dB
B= .            (19)
Here ),(~ BSy is the singular harvesting rate, implicitly given by equation (17). The
singular system indirectly depends on the cost of fishing and the value of birds. In the
next subsections (4.4.1 - 4.4.3), we consider various possibilities for a singular end
state. These are: an equilibrium with coexistence of birds and shellfish; an equilibrium
without birds; or, a limit cycle. From (18), it follows that, in equilibrium,
),(),(~ eeBee BSfBSy = , which is independent of time. Thus, the singular harvest rate
is constant at equilibrium. This means that the equilibria of the singular system must
be equal to the equilibria under fixed harvest rates, as studied in section 3 (see
equations (7) and (8)). Later, (see Section 4.4.2) we investigate the possibility that the
singular system has a limit cycle, which means that ),(~ BSy  in the end state is not
constant.
4.4.1 Equilibrium harvesting
From equation (18) and (19), it follows, that in equilibrium, 0~ ==− BS fyf .
Substitution of this in (17) gives:
S
f
B
f
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B
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S
c
S
f
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B
f BS
S
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∂
∂
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
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∂
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+
∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
−= )())(()(0 δδ  .            (20)
Equation (20) is the golden rule of an optimal equilibrium. Clark[1] and
Ströbele and Wacker [4] find two symmetric golden rules (one for each species) for
the optimal harvesting of two interacting species, when both species are harvested.
Ragozin and Brown [3] have generalized those results for harvesting n interacting
species (n symmetric equations). The difference with our result in equation (20)
springs from the fact that in our case the social welfare function depends on a species
(birds) that is not harvested and therefore can not be directly controlled. Furthermore,
we attach value to the number of predators remaining in the ecosystem instead of
those harvested.
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Equation (20) can be satisfied in many ways. Either the two main terms are
non-zero and of equal size, or either (21) or (22), and (23) hold. First, however, we
discuss the equilibrium when a combination of the following terms are zero:
0))(( =
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
−− S
S f
S
c
S
f
cp δ            (21)
and
0=
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−
B
fBδ            (22)
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v BS
.            (23)
Note that 0≠
∂
∂
S
fB
. Equation (21) is the standard golden rule for the harvesting of a
single species [1]. It reflects the direct change in profit due to a change in the
equilibrium shellfish stock, when birds are kept constant. The terms in (21) express
the impact of a change in shellfish stock on social welfare through three channels:
• more interest on extra income from catching one unit more fish, δ)( cp − ;
• less future income through stock effects, i.e. less future harvesting, 
S
f
cp S
∂
∂
−− )( ;
• an increased cost of future harvesting due to stock effects, SfS
c
∂
∂
.
Note that, only if (21) is satisfied (and thus also (23) holds), can the optimal harvest
rate in the present multi-species context equal the optimal harvest rate in the single
species context. Expression (23) shows the indirect effect of a change in shellfish
stock on social welfare that occurs via changes in the number of birds. A change in
the number of shellfish changes the number of birds by a factor 
S
fB
∂
∂
. This results in a
change of the value of birds by 
B
v
∂
∂
. In addition, a change in bird numbers means a
change in natural predation, so that the shellfish stock changes (by 
B
fS
∂
∂ ). This is
translated into value terms through the net benefit of extra fish to fisheries, ( cp − ).
When (21) is satisfied, no direct gains can be made by a change in shellfish stock.
Then (23) must hold too, so that neither can any gains be made through a change in
bird numbers.
Secondly, equation (20) is satisfied when both (23) and an even more
elementary golden rule, equation (22), hold. This means there are no marginal net
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benefits due to a change in bird stock (23), because the marginal growth rate for birds
exactly matches the discount rate. In other words, changing the harvest rate does not
lead to extra net benefits because benefits (more value of more birds) cancel out
against cost (the opportunity cost of waiting, i.e. the discount rate).
Third, to better understand (20) as a whole (both main terms are non-zero),
one can use (16) to express equation (20) in terms of the shadow price for birds. This
leads to the following recursive expression in Bλ :



∂
∂
+
∂
∂
−+
∂
∂
= B
BS
B B
f
B
f
cp
B
v λδλ )(
1
.
The shadow price of birds represents the marginal social benefit (or cost) of a
marginal change in the number of birds. In simple terms, this is the price of an extra
bird in the ecosystem. In equilibrium, it is equal to the discounted sum of three
elements:
• a change in the direct value of birds, 
B
v
∂
∂
;
• a change in net revenues of harvesting due to a change in the equilibrium shellfish
stock, 
B
f
cp S
∂
∂
− )( ;
• a change in the number of birds due to a change in the number of offspring,
valued against the shadow price, BBB
f λ
∂
∂
.
4.4.1.1 Equilibrium harvesting when S=Se1
Any equilibrium is located on the B-isocline , so that either 1eSS =  or 0=B .
First, we consider an equilibrium on 1eSS = . In the next section (4.4.1.2), we will
analyze an equilibrium on 0=B . From now on, our analysis is less general. We will
explicitly use the growth functions from the ecological model, ),( 1 eeS BSf  and
),( 1 eeB BSf , as given in equations (5) and (6), respectively, to determine the location
of the singular equilibrium of the harvested ecosystem. To find the optimal number of
birds in equilibrium, we take the derivatives of ),( 1 eeS BSf  and ),( 1 eeB BSf  with
respect to S  and B , and substitute these together with the equilibrium value of 1eS
(equation (7)), in (20). This gives us the following implicit solution for eB :
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1
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δδ
δδ
,            (24)
where 
ahK
KzqK
a
KSqKB e )(
1
0
−
−=−=  is the number of birds in the natural (non-
harvest) equilibrium.
Depending on the shape of )(Bv  and the marginal costs of fishing at the
equilibrium ( 1eS ), one, several or no solution exist. In Appendix III, it is shown that
two types of coexistence (of birds and shellfish) equilibria exist, each characterized by
a particular set of necessary conditions.
The two types of equilibria can be explained as follows. A type I equilibrium
exists if, in the absence of birds, fishers would prefer to fish at a shellfish stock level
less than 1eS . In contrast, a type II equilibrium exists if fishers would prefer to fish at
a stock level higher than 1eS , in the absence of birds. In each case, birds are a
nuisance to fishers but in two different ways. In a type I equilibrium, birds decrease
the catch because they eat shellfish that fishers would like to have caught. In a type II
equilibrium, the birds increase the fishing costs by depleting the shellfish stock.
4.4.1.2 Equilibrium harvesting when B=0
Now, we consider the singular end state to be an equilibrium on the S-axis. Of
course, the system must be able to reach this state, so 
a
Sqy e1max −≥  (see equation
(8)). Since 0=
∂
∂
S
Sf B )0,(
, the condition to derive equation (17) is not satisfied. For a
singular equilibrium on the S-axis, we must have )0,(~ es Sfy =  (see equation (18)).
Given that the system is in equilibrium, it follows from (15) that 0=Sλ . Substituting
0=Sλ , equation (15) and 0=B  in equation (12) eliminates Sλ  and results in:
 0)0,()())0,())((( =
∂
∂
+
∂
−− eS
eeS
e SfS
Sc
S
SfScp δ .            (25)
Again we have the well-known golden rule for harvesting in a single species
ecosystem [1]. This makes sense because birds are extinct, so they do not influence
the amount of shellfish in the end state. Equation (25) implicitly defines the number
of shellfish in the singular equilibrium.
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Substituting 
K
BSf eS 0)0,( =  and 
aS
Sf eS 1)0,(
−=
∂
∂ in (25), then the Left Hand
Size (LHS) of (25) increases monotonically as S  increases. Hence, no more than one
solution is defined by (25). If, for some S , the LHS of (25) is greater than zero,
consequently eSS >  . This shows the interpretation of the type I and type II equilibria
from the previous section and Appendix III. In this respect, note that, for a type I
equilibrium, the LHS of (25) is greater than zero at 1eS  and thus the optimum when
birds are extinct is smaller than 1eS . For a type II system, the equilibrium lies to the
right of 1eS  and is not attainable unless birds are eliminated first.
4.4.2 Singular cyclical harvesting
Semmler and Sieveking [5] show that optimal constant harvesting may push a
predator-prey system into cyclical behavior, whereas without harvesting the system
would reach equilibrium. This does not hold for the system studied here.. As shown in
Section 3 constant harvesting causes the ecosystem to reach an equilibrium. From the
dynamic optimization literature, e.g. [16-19], it is known that a non-steady singular
control can cause an optimal path to take the form of a limit cycle. Suppose such a
limit cycle exists, then it is necessary to establish whether the associated singular
control )(~ ty  is feasible, meaning that max)(~0 yty ≤≤ . The trace condition [17] can be
applied to rule out limit cycles. Otherwise, the Hopf bifurcation theorem [16, 18, 19]
can be used to show that limit cycles are possible for certain combinations of
parameter values. Both methods require the Jacobian of the singular system. The
Jacobian must have purely imaginary eigenvalues for the Hopf-bifurcation. Because
the system equations (18) and (19) consist of second-order partial derivatives of
),( BSfS  and ),( BSf B , determining eigenvalues is a cumbersome and tedious task.
Therefore, we use a less traditional approach to determine the possibility of a limit
cycle as the end state.
We can exclude limit cycles when qy ≤max . This follows from the stability
analysis of the original system, because for any qty <)(  no limit cycles can exist
(equation (AII-4)). In order to have a limit cycle qty ≥)(  for some t . Thus, qy ≤max .
Moreover, a limit cycle will follow a closed orbit around an equilibrium.
Suppose the equilibrium exists, then we can use the transversality conditions (14) to
determine the manifold on which an optimal limit cycle must circle. On this manifold,
the shadow prices are strictly positive. From equation (15), it follows that a profit
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must be made from the fishery throughout the singular limit cycle, and thus 0SS ≥ ,
with pSc =)( 0 . Furthermore, an extra condition for the existence of an optimal
singular limit cycle can be derived from the knowledge that the shadow price of birds
must be strictly positive along the limit cycle. Using (16), 0>Bλ  and 0
),(
>
∂
∂
S
BSf B
,
we find that



∂
∂
−−−>
∂
∂
S
BSfScpBSf
S
Sc S
S
),())((),()( δ .            (26)
At the B-isocline, equation (26) transforms to (AIII-8), which tells us the minimum
value of B , for which Bλ  is positive. Because the limit cycle circles around eB , it
will intersect 1eSS =  below the equilibrium , eB , and above the minimum for which
0>Bλ . Therefore, also eB  must lie in the manifold where Bλ  is positive. So, in order
for the system to have an optimal singular limit cycle, it must have a singular
equilibrium with positive Bλ . This means the equilibrium is either of type I, or that
when it is of type II, equation (AIII-9) must hold (see Appendix III).
4.4.3 The influence of the discount rate and costs
The discount rate plays a pivotal role in establishing the singular solutions of
the system. Suppose we have a system in which birds can become extinct:
a
Sqy e1max −> . Then, for a large enough δ ,  equation (AIII-2) is satisfied, but not
(AIII-4) so that we can have an end state in which birds are extinct.  For a slightly
smaller δ , (AIII-4) is satisfied, and (AIII-5) (just one equilibrium on 1eSS = ) is not
satisfied. Then the system has between one and three equilibria, one on the S-axis and
none, one or two on the B-isocline. A limit cycle is also possible, provided y qmax > .
If δ  again becomes slightly smaller, then (AIII-5) is satisfied too and no more than
two equilibria remain, one at 0=B  and one at 1eSS = . For a sufficiently small
enough δ  (AIII-6), the system can have an optimal type II equilibrium. This
illustrates how δ  serves as bifurcation parameter.
The costs at 1eSS = can also serve as bifurcation parameter. Given the right
cost function, every type of singular state is possible. This is relevant because fishers
will try to reduce fishing costs, which will lead to new optimal end states.  If the
reduction leads to an increase in the marginal cost of fishing, the system will lose its
type II equilibrium but it will gain a type I equilibrium and an equilibrium in which
20
birds are extinct. For low enough costs at 1eSS = , the singular system has only one
type I equilibrium. For even lower costs, birds will become extinct.
This illustrates that the incentive of cost reduction can push the system to a
different type of equilibrium. Equation (24) shows that through cost reduction the
optimal number of birds, and consequently the optimal harvest rate, may go up or
down, depending on how marginal costs change. The result of cost reduction could be
lower optimal harvest rates, resulting in lower fishing revenues and possibly lower
profits. In this case, policy makers would have a very difficult task. They would have
to reward the higher efficiency of fishers by setting higher quota that reduce the
income fishers can realize. Of course, the optimum value of the social welfare
function increases when costs are reduced.
4.5 A bang-bang cycle: case 4
The last conceivable end state is one in which )(ty continuously switches
between 0 and maxy . This is sometimes called pulse fishing. Pulse fishing can push
the system into a cycle. We will call this a bang-bang cycle. A bang-bang cycle can
also be realized by switching harvest rates between maxy , 0 , and )(~ ty , the singular
control. Alternatively, a bang-bang control can move the system closer and closer to
some point. We will discuss this in Section 5, when we examine approach paths.
Typically, a cycle will cross the B-isocline because, for every harvest rate, bird
numbers increase  to the right of it and decrease to the left of it. Figure 3 illustrates a
typical bang-bang cycle.
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Figure 3: Phase diagram of a bang-bang cycle.
Note: The cycle is caused by alternating between maximum harvesting and not harvesting. The
isoclines of the harvested and non-harvested system are shown in gray. The equilibria of both systems
are denoted by a black dot. At the intersection of the two trajectories, the harvest rate is switched. Thus,
neither the harvest nor the non-harvest equilibrium is ever reached and the bang-bang control is
repeated for ever.
The phase diagram in Figure 3 shows that, when harvesting is stopped, the shellfish
stock size increases while the bird population size keeps on decreasing. Only after a
while, when 1eSS = , will bird numbers increase again. Also when the fishers start
fishing to the right of the B-isocline ( 1eSS > ), bird numbers will increase in spite of
fishing until the number of shellfish is 1eS . The simplest bang-bang cycle consists of
two branches as in Figure 3: one on which is harvested and the number of shellfish
declines, and another on which no fishing takes place and shellfish and birds
recuperate.
4.6 Costs as a non-linear function of harvesting
Until now, we have assumed costs to increase linearly with the harvest rate.
Suppose, however, that the cost function is non-linear in y : ),( ySc  instead of
ySc )( . In this case, the maximum of the Hamiltonian is not at one of the extremes
( maxyy =  or 0=y ). Instead, an interior solution may exist. The maximum condition
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becomes Sy
yScp
y
H λ=
∂
∂
−⇒=
∂
∂ ),(
    0 , which replaces equation (15). The analysis
of the optimal end state is restricted to analysis of the singular state, leading to the
same results for the equilibria and cycles, as derived in the previous sections, but with
)(Sc  substituted by 
y
ySc
∂
∂ ),(
. Assuming, furthermore, that the Hamiltonian is
concave in S , B and y , the necessary conditions are also sufficient [15]. The optimal
solution, the approach path and the end state are given by applying the singular
harvest rate.
5. Qualitative analysis of approach paths
The harvest rate on the approach path (as elsewhere) is either bang-bang or
singular. We will qualitatively describe how the system reacts under bang-bang
control and it will automatically become clear when and how the singular control
must be applied. We make use of the theory of variable structure systems [20] to
describe the behavior of the ecosystem under bang-bang control. The optimal
harvested ecosystem can be considered to consist of three subsystems: one in which
maxyy = , one in which 0=y ; and, one in which ),(~ BSyy =  (singular, equation
(17)). These subsystems correspond to different regions in the phase diagram. A
switching line separates the regions of maximum harvesting and no harvesting. The
switching line is the projection on the ),( BS -phase plane of the points where the
optimal trajectory of the four-dimensional state/co-state system (equations (5), (6),
(12) and (13)) intersects the singular manifold, sScp λ=− )( .
Each subsystem has its own equilibrium points. The position of the switching line
will determine if the equilibrium of a subsystem is located in the region where that
subsystem is active. That means the equilibrium can be reached. If an equilibrium of a
subsystem can be reached, it is called ’real’. If it can not be reached it is called ’virtual’.
On one side of the switching line, sScp λ<− )( , so that no fishing occurs. On the
other side, sScp λ>− )(  so that fishing occurs at the maximum rate. When as in
Figure 4, the switching line is located such that the equilibrium of the harvested
system lies in the region in which no harvest occurs, then the harvest equilibrium can
not be reached. It is a virtual equilibrium, as opposed to the unharvested equilibrium
which is a real equilibrium because it can be reached.
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Suppose one of the equilibria is real and the other(s) is (are) virtual. Then the real
equilibrium will be reached (see Figure 4). When all equilibria are real, one will be
reached depending on the initial state (see Figure 5). If all equilibria are virtual
equilibria, the system will experience bang-bang control (see Figure 6 and 7) until a
state is reached where the singular harvest rate must be applied. A bang-bang cycle is
a special case where two virtual equilibria exist and the bang-bang control must be
applied infinitely. Generally, the system will end in equilibrium with a singular
harvest rate.
S
B
B0
Harvest
No harvest
Se2 Se1
0
Figure 4: Phase diagram of a system with bang-bang control.
Note: The system has one virtual and one real equilibrium. The thick gray curves denote the isoclines
of the harvested and non-harvested system. The thin line is the switching line. A trajectory will
approach the real equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Phase diagram of a system with bang-bang control.
Note: The system has real two real equilibria. Three trajectories are shown. Depending on the initial
condition the trajectory approaches the harvest or non-harvest equilibrium. The thin line is the
switching line.
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0
Figure 6: Phase diagram of a system with bang-bang control.
Note: The system has two virtual equilibria and approaches a point (the singular equilibrium) on the B-
isocline. The thick gray curves denote the isoclines of the harvested and non-harvested system. The
thin line is the switching line.
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Suppose the trajectory on both sides of the switching line is directed towards
the switching line and thus towards the other region. This is best seen in Figure 7, but
it also happens in Figure 6. The system will arrive at the switching line and will not be
able to leave, therefore it must slide along it. In effect, this means that the singular
harvest rate is applied and the system follows a singular trajectory, because the system
moves along a path on which sScp λ=− )( . Thus, in this case, (part of) the switching
line is a singular trajectory. It has turned out to be difficult to prove or disprove
whether in fact, the switching line must be a singular trajectory. A more complex
switching line and resulting system behavior is possible if the system has several
singular equilibria. An example is given in Figure 7. If we assume that the optimal
trajectory ends in a singular equilibrium on the B-isocline then the switching line
crosses or at least touches the B-isocline at the equilibrium. The examples in
Figures 5-7 show that an end state is an equilibrium at the singular, the maximum or
the minimum harvest rate. But in special cases, the approach path never reaches
equilibrium. This means the end state is a limit cycle either singular or bang-bang
(Figure 4).
Figure 7: Phase diagram of a system with bang-bang control.
Note: The system has real two virtual equilibrium and approaches one of the singular equilibria,
depending on the initial condition. The thick gray curves denote the isoclines of the harvested and non-
harvested system. The thin black line is the switching line. Close to the singular equilibrium, the
system cannot cross the switching line and must follow it under singular control.
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6. Conclusion
This paper illustrates that several types of optimal harvesting solutions are
possible in a predator-prey system when conservation of the predator species is
considered valuable. The type of solution depends on economic parameters e.g. the
maximum harvest rate, the discount rate, and the cost of fishing, as well as on
ecological parameters such as  the predator’s search and handling time of prey. The
final optimal harvest rate can be constant, resulting in an equilibrium, either with or
without the predator species. For different economic and ecological parameters, the
optimal harvest rate can become cyclical, resulting in oscillating populations of
predator and prey species.
After an initial period the system reaches the end state. The end state can be one
of three possibilities not fishing, fishing maximally, or fishing at a singular harvest
rate. The necessary conditions for each possible singular end state are derived in
Section 4. For some combinations of parameters, several end states can exist. In that
case, the value of the welfare function and the initial conditions will determine which
end state will be reached. But the most valuable end state will not necessarily be the
optimal one. For a high discount rate, the path to an end state may be more valuable
than the end state itself, even if this state lasts forever.
The paper illustrates the approach paths towards the end states. The approach path
towards an equilibrium end state will usually consist of some period of bang-bang
control followed by a singular harvest rate. Several possibilities are shown
graphically. However, when the Hamiltonian has an interior maximum, the optimal
solution is given by applying the singular harvest rate.
The optimum may not be stable over time. Fishers have an incentive to lower
costs, because this will seem to increase their income. The regulator will encourage
this because it is also beneficial to society. The social welfare function does indeed
increase with lower costs. However, what happens to the socially optimal harvest rate
depends on how the marginal cost at the equilibrium ( 1eS ) changes. If the optimal
harvest rate decreases, tension between regulator and fishers will arise. Fishers will
feel that increasing efficiency is punished.
Evidently, the results provide incomplete information for policy design. For
example, the introduction of measures involves the administration of stock levels,
harvest rate and so on. Moreover, then the measures have to be enforced. All this
comes with a cost that we have ignored in specifying our welfare function and
subsequently in defining the optimal state. For example, it may be much more costly
to ensure a cyclical harvest rate than to maintain a constant harvest rate.
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Appendix I: The balance of mass
The increase in the mass of birds must be less or equal to the mass of the
depleted shellfish, 
hSz
BSd
KS
hSz
rB
dt
dB
+
=≤

 +
−= 1 . For small numbers of
shellfish, 
hK
zS
−
≤ , this condition is true because 

 +
−
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hSz1  is negative. For large
numbers of shellfish, 
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−
> , the condition is true if
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Appendix II: Stability analysis
From an analysis of the direction of the vector field, it follows immediately
that )0,( 2eS is a saddle point. Equilibrium ),( 11 ee BS  is Lyapunov stable, when the real
part of all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, ),( 11 ee BSDf , are negative.










∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
B
BSf
S
BSf
B
BSf
S
BSf
BSDf
BB
SS
),(),(
),(),(
),(
Lyapunov stability means that a trajectory will stay within a finite distance from the
equilibrium whenever it comes close enough to that equilibrium. The eigenvalues of
),( 11 ee BSDf  are:
))(4(
2
1 2 DKzaKrzDD
aKz
++± , (AII-1)
with 0)()( 2 <−−−−= hzhKayqD . (AII-2)
A negative real part of the eigenvalue means that the equilibrium is stable.
Equation (AII-2) shows D  is negative. From equation (AII-1) we can see that the
eigenvalue will have a negative real part if the square root term is smaller then D .
That is the case when 0<+ DKz , which leads to
 ayq
hK
z )()( −<− . (AII-3)
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This condition is satisfied because 21 ee SS <  (Figure 1) so that the equilibrium is
stable.
When the eigenvalue is complex, the equilibrium is a stable focus, meaning
that the trajectory oscillates around the equilibrium with ever decreasing amplitude. If
the eigenvalue is real, ),( 11 ee BS  is a node. This means the trajectory asymptotically
approaches the equilibrium. The eigenvalue is real if the square root term is positive.
The square root term, )(42 DKzaKrzD ++ , is a parabola in D . For 
a
r
1
< , it has no
roots and is positive. Thus, the equilibrium is a node if the birth rate for birds is
smaller than the additional mortality rate for shellfish. For 
a
r
1≥ , the parabola has
two roots: namely, ))1((21 arararKzD −−=  and ))1((22 arararKzD +−−= .
The eigenvalues are real, i.e. the square root term is positive, for
121
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−
−−−
≤⇒≥ , and for
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ee ShK
harararKSDD
−
−−+
≥⇒≤ . Hence, the system has a node if the
two equilibria are either close together or far apart.
We have proved that the system is locally stable by looking at the linearized
system. We now prove that the system is also globally stable by showing that the
system does not tend to a limit cycle. Using the Bendixson-Dulac criterion [11], we
can prove that the system does not have a limit cycle in phase space. If such a closed
trajectory C  exists then 0)(∫ =⋅


C
dln
B
S


, with n  the outward normal on C . The dot
product must equal zero because the trajectory follows C . Green’s theorem
yields: ∫∫∫ ⋅

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=
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
, with A , the surface enclosed by
C .
So, if we can find a function ),( BSg  for which the sign of the integrand is always
positive or always negative over at least A , then the surface integral must be unequal
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to zero. Consequently, this means C  is not a trajectory. Taking 
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This implies the system has no limit cycles for 0>B  and qy <max .
By observing the vector field in Figure 2, it is clear that the equilibrium
),( 11 ee BS  must be globally stable. The system is locally stable, so any trajectory
starting at an initial point in a neighborhood Ω  of ),( 11 ee BS  will tend towards the
equilibrium. Suppose that a trajectory starting at a point outside Ω  moved away from
the equilibrium. Due to continuity of the system, a trajectory starting on the border of
Ω  has to follow that border, which is impossible because it would imply the system
has a limit cycle. Therefore ),( 11 ee BS must be a globally stable equilibrium.
Appendix III: Conditions for a singular equilibrium on S=Se1
Equation (24) can be rewritten into equation (AIII-1) which allows for a
graphical interpretation of the solution:
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Figure AIII-1 shows equation (AIII-1) graphically. The Right Hand Side
(RHS) of equation (AIII-1) is a hyperbolic function shown in black. It can be one of
two different forms depending on the sign of the second RHS term. We call the RHS
type I when the second RHS term is positive and type II when it is negative. The Left
Hand Side (LHS) of equation (AIII-1), the marginal value of birds, is shown in gray.
We consider two possible forms of the bird-value function: namely, an S-shaped and a
concave function. The intersection point of a black and a gray curve defines a solution
for equation (AIII-1). That is the singular equilibrium value of B .
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Figure AIII-1: Graphical representation of possible solutions to equation (AIII-1).
Note: The black curves denote the RHS of (AIII-1) for two types of hyperbolic functions. The gray
curves denote the LHS of (AIII-1) for a concave and for an S-shaped bird-value function.
We call the solution a type I equilibrium when the RHS is of type I, meaning:
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and a type II equilibrium when the RHS is of type II, meaning:
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A type I (II) system means that if the system is in an optimal equilibrium with birds
extinct, S  is smaller (larger) than 1eS . For further discussion see Section 4.4.1.3,
where singular equilibria on the S-axis are discussed.
From the graph in Figure AIII-1 and from the condition 00 BBe << , we can
deduce the following conditions for the solutions of equation (24) or (AIII-1). There
can be 0,1 or 2 type I equilibria. The minimum of the LHS (gray) must be smaller
than the maximum of the type I RHS (black), or the two curves will not intersect.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the existence of a type I equilibrium is:
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The RHS of (AIII-4) equals the RHS of (AIII-1) for 0B , its minimum value. If )(Bv
is concave, then 
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This can be seen from Figure AIII-1.
When the RHS is of type II, up to 3 equilibria may exist. A necessary
condition for a type II equilibrium is:
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For a concave )(Bv , no more than one equilibrium exists and (AIII-6) is also a
sufficient condition. If )(Bv  is S-shaped, up to three equilibria may exist. Equation
(AIII-7) gives a necessary condition for the existence of more than one equilibrium:
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We are looking for possible end states. Not every singular equilibrium is a
possible end state, because it may not be optimal. According to the transversality
condition (14), the shadow price of birds needs to be positive for an optimal end state.
Let us consider the singular end state on the B-isocline. Substituting 1eSS =  and
equation (16) in 0>Bλ  leads to:
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This equation defines the minimum number of birds on a singular trajectory for which
the shadow price is positive, i.e. a lower bound to the number of birds in a singular
coexistence end state. The denominator is positive, and, because eB  is positive and
singular, an equilibrium of type I will satisfy (AIII-8). If the equilibrium is of type II,
we can combine equation (24) with (AIII-8) to derive the following necessary
condition that ensures the type II equilibrium is optimal:
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